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Problem Families: the Influence of Strategic Family Holdings on Environmental, 
Social and Governance Rankings 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: We investigate the relationship between family ownership 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) and assume that entrenched family owners 
may have incentives to either promote or inhibit environmental, social or governance 
performance (ESG). We also examine how the firm’s governance system intervenes 
between family ownership and its effect on CSR.   
Research Findings/Insights: For a sample of 24,873 firm year observations drawn 
from 2002 to 2012 covering 46 countries and 3,919 firms, our findings show that 
family ownership is negatively associated with ESG performance as assessed by 
ASSET4. Although the direction of causality cannot be empirically proven, we argue 
that corporate social responsibility is an unlikely cause of family ownership. 
Furthermore we find that family ownership has a negative impact for firms with either 
high or low CSR. This is consistent with ownership impacting on CSR but 
inconsistent with the reverse as family firms would not be attracted to high CSR 
firms. Our results also show that family ownership is associated with poor corporate 
governance. Once we control for governance strategic ownership is no longer 
associated with CSR  but family ownership retains a significant association. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Previous research has suggested that family 
ownership may impact positively on ESG due to the owners’ identification with 
various stakeholders affected by ESG, or conversely that the wealth maximisation 
 2 
incentive for undiversified family owners may cause them to restrict those ESG 
activities which are seen as negatively impacting on firm value. Our results are 
consistent with the latter. They also show that the influence is primarily through firm 
governance practices and not via the owners’ direct influence on management 
decisions. 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Assuming that corporate social responsibility can 
have a substantial impact on the environment, the wellbeing of firms’ stakeholders 
and society in general, regulators will want to improve ESG performance. Our results 
suggest that encouraging diversified ownership and/or encouraging or regulating for 
better internal governance to mitigate the influence of entrenched family ownership 
may lead to better CSR performance.   
 
Key words: Corporate Governance; Corporate Social Responsibility; Family Firms; 
Concentrated Ownership 
 
 3 
Problem Families: the Influence of Strategic Family Holdings on Environmental, 
Social and Governance Rankings 
 
This study examines the impact of strategic equity holdings, especially family 
strategic holdings, on ASSET4’s assessment of the environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) performance of firms. Whilst corporate social responsibility has 
been much researched there is little evidence concerning the factors that encourage or 
hinder environmental, social and governance investment (Margolis, Elfenbein, & 
Walsh, 2007). This paper takes the view that climate change, the failure of corporate 
governance contributing to the financial crisis, and problems with the ethical 
approach of firms and wealth inequalities all point to the importance of corporate 
social responsibility in general and ESG in particular.  Whilst the costs attributable to 
ESG investment may be presumed to fall on the firm and its owners, the benefits may 
partly fall on other stakeholders, including employees, customers, firms, society and 
the state. This could lead to underinvestment in ESG, at least as perceived by 
stakeholders other than investors. If so, an understanding of those factors which 
impact on ESG investment, here assumed to be reflected in ESG scores, may be 
important. 
The sample consists of 24,873 firm/years drawn from 2002-2012 for 46 
countries, mainly representing developed economies. For each case we match the 
social, environmental and governance scores provided by ASSET4 with equity 
strategic holdings available from Worldscope together with financial controls and 
firm characteristics. The ESG scores, used as the dependent variable, no doubt 
measure underlying ESG performance with error. However, ASSET4 scores are 
positively and significantly associated with similar scores that are available from 
 4 
FTSE4Good and it is not obvious why any error in the ESG scores would be 
systematically associated with the independent variables. Equally, the strategic equity 
holdings recorded by Worldscope may measure equity holdings with error but we 
supplement the analysis of the recorded percentile with an analysis based simply on 
the dichotomy between more or less than 10 percent holdings.  
It is not obvious what the best measure of strategic equity holdings should be. 
The analysis assumes that, for example, employee/family or investment institutions’ 
equity holdings are best measured as the total for each category. It is certainly quite 
possible that members of a family, or like-minded institutions, will act in concert or 
simply have the same incentives and constraints. It is also possible that a measure of 
the total family equity holding is a misleading measure. For that reason much of the 
analysis is based on a simple categorisation: does the firm have a substantial equity 
holding, designated as a strategic equity holding, attributable to a type of shareholder? 
Thus the analysis investigates whether firms with large government equity holdings, 
or substantial leverage, act differently from those with substantial family or corporate 
cross-holdings.  
The first results are based on conventional regression techniques where the 
social, environmental or governance score is modelled against the test variable 
identifying the strategic holdings and a set of control variables accounting for year, 
industry, country, leverage, profitability, market-to-book and capitalisation. The 
results are largely consistent: entrenched strategic equity holders, and in particular 
family strategic shareholdings, are associated with lower ESG. However, simply 
demonstrating an association between strategic shareholdings and ESG scores does 
not show that the ownership structure causes the low ESG.  
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We investigate causality by first arguing that in the case of family ownership a 
reverse causality is unlikely. It requires that low levels of ESG encourage investors to 
retain their family ownership and that high ESG could not be countered by direct 
action from powerful entrenched owners. Our evidence suggests that the typical 
family ownership in a firm with family investors is 28 percent. We also use quantile 
regressions to investigate the relationship between ownership and ESG for cases 
where the ESG score is higher than would be expected given the firm characteristics. 
Here we obtain a slightly stronger negative impact of family ownership on ESG than 
for firms with relatively low ESG. This is inconsistent with the argument that low 
ESG encourages family ownership retention. 
Additional results are derived from a propensity score matching (PSM) 
approach that attempts to resolve the endogeneity difficulty inherent in conventional 
regression modelling (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). If the regression model apparently 
demonstrates that an independent variable, X, is significantly associated with the 
outcome variable, Y, this may be because both X and Y are “caused” by Z. It is only 
under particular circumstances that including Z on the right hand side will fix this 
problem (Armstrong, Jagolinzer & Larcker, 2010). Instead, PSM models the 
probability that a particular case will be treated i.e. X=1 assuming a zero-one 
categorisation, and matches cases with similar probabilities of X=1, where one case is 
treated and the other is not. The difference in the outcome variable, Y, can then be 
assessed. However, the in the main our results based on PSM are consistent with the 
regression models.  
This study adds to a limited set of recent research papers that attempt to 
explain what affects ESG performance in firms (Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2010; Rees & Mackenzie, 2011). These studies have focused on 
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institutional and/or international dimensions and have incorporated financing largely 
as a marginal item of interest. The results in prior research relevant to financing are 
also inconsistent and preliminary. The underlying assumption is that managers are 
sympathetic to ESG investment but investors may not be, particularly if undiversified 
(Barnea & Rubin, 2010). Whilst the results are particular to the ESG investment 
context they also shed light on the real impact that ownership structure can have on 
managerial decision-making. The findings robustly indicate that strategic ownership, 
and employee/family equity holdings in particular, tend to be associated with lower 
ESG scores. Given the large impact ownership attributes appear to have on ESG 
performance scores, the implications for policy makers intending to promote ESG 
investment are potentially important. 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Large Shareholdings and CSR  
Whatever costs and benefits a corporation encounters from CSR activities, they are 
borne by the equity owners (Cox, Brammer, & Millington, 2004).  The cost-benefit 
balance influences corporate performance and attracts certain types of investors 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) who buy or sell their shares exerting ‘walk activism’ 
(Chung & Talaulicar, 2010). However, given the long-term nature of concentrated 
ownership (Cox et al., 2004) and resulting strategic rather than trading interests, large 
owners are shown to monitor management rather than simply exit the company 
(Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Johnson & Greening, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
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While the way large equity holders influence management decision-making is 
complex, their interventions are guided by the perceived ultimate return on their 
investments (Clark & Hebb, 2005; Lydenberg, 2007). Regarding CSR projects, 
management literature has offered substantial evidence as to how these investments 
could be beneficial. Outstanding CSR is argued to be a source of competitive 
advantage (Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006; Bansal & Roth, 2000; Berry 
& Rondinelli, 1998; Jones, 1995; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Porter & van der 
Linde, 1995). This advantage can come from distinguishing the brand, signalling 
quality and appealing to conscientious consumers (Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, & Hill, 
2006; Fisman, Heal, & Nair, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Siegel & Vitaliano, 
2007), employees (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010; Brekke & Nyborg, 2008; Turban & 
Greening, 1997) and responsible investors (Cox et al., 2004; Dimson, Karakaş, & Li, 
2012).  
Apart from the likely link between the above competitive advantage and value 
creation, strong corporate social performance is shown to be associated with more 
favorable financing terms (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2011). Furthermore, good 
relations with the bondholders and creditors and the resulting effect on the cost of 
capital are arguably directly relevant for long-term investors with large stakes who 
have to borrow substantial resources on the debt market (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The positive association between strong CSR and better access to finance may come 
from strong CSR being related to better overall management competence (Berry & 
Rondinelli, 1998; Hart, 1995; Karkkainen, 2001; Solomon, Solomon, & Suto, 2004; 
Stephan, 2002), stronger governance and hence lower information asymmetry 
(Renneboog, Ter-Horst, & Zhang, 2008) and lower risks of the costs associated with 
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potential conflicts with stakeholders (Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Jo & 
Harjoto, 2011).  
However, prior evidence remains inconclusive as to whether superior social 
performance results in superior financial performance (Barnett & Salomon, 2006; 
Margolis et al., 2007; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Renneboog et al., 2008). At the 
same time, the scope for management discretion regarding expenditures on various 
social and environmental projects may link them to managerial entrenchment and a 
source of agency conflict (Cespa & Cestone, 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 
2003). Bénabou and Tirole (2010) argue that managers regard CSR as a source of 
long-term value creation, a strategic tool to balance interests of various stakeholders 
or a way to pursue their own ethical position and personal agenda. Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) refer to the latter as the ‘warm-glow’ effect, and Rees and Mackenzie (2011) 
point out that it is tempting to acquiesce to the demand of stakeholders seeking CSR 
investment and that a reputation as a responsible manager may benefit managers’ 
careers. Barnea and Rubin (2010) argue that insider ownership may either permit 
insiders to encourage non-value maximising projects as they are strong enough to 
resist pressure from other investors to prioritise wealth maximisation, or alternatively, 
they may resist such investment as it will be personally costly. Therefore, strategic 
owners may not be convinced that CSR is a source of strategic opportunities and not 
part of a self-serving management agenda.  
Emerging evidence points consistently towards a generally negative 
association between blockholdings and CSR (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2010; Rees & 
Mackenzie, 2011; Rees & Rodionova, 2012). While our main focus is on family 
ownership, we firstly revisit the relationship between closely held blockholdings and 
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CSR and, based on the prior evidence discussed above, we predict the following 
relationship: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a negative relationship between strategic equity 
holdings and ESG.  
 
Families and CSR 
Family ownership is thought to be the most common ownership structure for firms 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). For example, Faccio and Lang 
(2002) find that 44.29 percent of firms in 13 Western European countries are family 
firms while one third of S&P firms can be regarded as controlled by families 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Families and business groups are also argued to dominate 
corporate control in emerging markets (Silva & Majluf, 2008). As large blockholders, 
families present a particular case. Using their power to monitor management, family 
ownership may reduce the manager-owner agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
yet at the same time it often gives rise to the agency conflicts between majority and 
minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny,  1997).  
Importantly, families invest their own funds and therefore have a complex 
nexus of economic and personal motives (Andres, 2008). As large blockholders, they 
have the power to pursue these objectives, whether at the expense of other 
shareholders or not. This has been shown to both benefit and jeopardise firm 
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Andres, 2008; Jara-
Bertín, López-Iturriaga, & López-de-Foronda, 2008). The latter comes, for example, 
from a negative corporate reputation caused by agency problems related to the 
expropriation of interests of minority shareholders (Delgado-García, de Quevedo-
Puente, and de la Fuente-Sabate 2010). Further, families are argued to prioritise stable 
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cash flow in order to sustain a privileged lifestyle (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schone, 
2005) and may forgo governance improvements in order to see the family member 
running the company (Andres, 2008). Conversely, Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) 
find that family firms have lower cost of debt financing, which the authors attribute to 
the improved relations with bondholders due to long-term commitment. Consistent 
with these findings, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family firms perform better 
than non-family firms as measured by return on assets, return on equity and Tobin’s 
Q. Therefore, the evidence of the direct impact of family ownership on corporate 
performance is inconclusive. 
What is consistent though is that a/the prevailing undiversified character of 
their portfolios and invested personal wealth determines the particular focus of 
families on those corporate decisions which bring them direct and certain benefits. 
For example, families have been shown to be reluctant about pursuing new 
technologies (Barth et al., 2005). Consequently, they may be expected to take a 
particular negative stance on CSR investments compared to other blockholders. 
Families may also oppose CSR projects related to emission reduction or human rights 
as the positive outcomes have mainly societal implications while the costs are 
internalised by the owners, rendering measurable financial benefits for the families 
uncertain (Starks, 2009; Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Conversely, other more 
diversified large equity holders such as investment institutions rely on multiple 
markets and may be affected by the economic consequences of political and social 
instability or environmental damage caused by weak CSR (Gjessing & Syse, 2007). 
These blockholders may therefore resist CSR to a lesser extent. Additionally, 
institutions are likely to have more reputational concerns and may favour the 
‘goodwill’ role of CSR (Godfrey et al., 2009).  
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Considering provisions related to corporate governance where the implications 
are ‘internal’ for the company, such as board composition, executive compensation 
and overall protection of shareholder rights, prior research shows that families are 
unlikely to welcome balanced power and low scope for discretion implied by strong 
internal governance (Rees & Rodionova, 2012). Conversely, diversified blockholders 
are more likely to favour these developments as they offer benefits in terms of 
reduced information asymmetry and facilitated monitoring. Taken together, prior 
evidence suggests that families may resist CSR more strongly than other 
blockholders, and we therefore predict the following relationship: 
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between ownership and ESG is 
stronger for family shareholdings than for strategic blockholdings in general. 
 
The Mediating Impact of Governance 
Apart from influencing corporate performance directly, blockholders may exert their 
impact through governance and decision rights. Overall, we may expect that 
governance reduces the negative effect of blockholdings on CSR. Indeed, where 
managers act according to shareholder value maximisation, they may favour those 
CSR initiatives where the benefits are more internal (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; 
Rees & Rodionova, 2012). If managers act in line with [the] institutional theory and 
consider CSR as a strategic move to improve relationships with various stakeholders 
and sustain firm prosperity, they are likely to favour CSR in general despite the 
possible negative immediate impact on the firm value (Mackenzie, Rees, & 
Rodionova, 2013). We therefore predict the following relationship: 
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Hypothesis 3. Higher levels of internal governance reduce the negative impact 
of strategic owners on ESG. 
 
The influence of family owners in particular is also shown to be reinforced by 
their impact on governance. Barth et al. (2005) find that the negative influence of 
family ownership on firm productivity comes more from unrestricted control rather 
than ownership structure per se. This could be explained, for example, by the limited 
inflow of managerial talent and lower motivation on the part of middle managers to 
outperform given limited career prospects.  Conversely, some studies find that 
financial performance is better in firms where the CEO comes from the family, rather 
than in firms run by an outsider (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). However, these results are not very strong. For example, Anderson and 
Reeb (2003) show that the positive impact of active family control disappears when 
the ownership exceeds 30 percent while Maury (2006) finds no value benefits of 
family control when the minority shareholder protection is weak. Adding to the 
inconclusive evidence, Morck, Stangeland and Young (1998) report an association 
between lower financial performance and family control.  
Stronger governance, such as presence of independent directors on the board 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and outside shareholder monitoring (Maury & Pajuste, 
2005) is argued to help reduce family opportunism. However, the undiversified 
character of family ownership, which implies concentrated attention on a particular 
firm, could lead to families influencing corporate decision-making beyond their 
impact on the governance. For example, Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggest that 
family control is value-enhancing in a well-regulated economy. This suggests that in 
order to influence corporate performance, families do not have to rely solely on their 
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capture of the governance system. Given their likely strong negative views on 
expenditures in CSR activities and concerns about control over their personal invested 
funds, we therefore expect the? negative influence of families on CSR to stretch 
beyond the impact on governance: 
Hypothesis 4. The negative relationship between family ownership and ESG is 
less affected by the internal governance system than the relationship between 
strategic ownership and ESG. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
OLS Regression Models 
The initial results are based on a pooled time-series and cross-sectional sample of 
international firms. Our initial approaches are based on Jo and Harjoto (2012) where 
we control for sample selection bias and pool the sample across countries, industries 
and years. We differ from Jo and Harjoto (2012) in that we control for countries,  
unnecessary in their single economy setting, for years and for the firm level clustering 
of error terms. If we omit year dummies we find statistically significant relationships 
that are driven by sample-wide time trends that can appear to suggest firm-specific 
causal relationships where none exist. If we omit controls for the firm-specific 
clustering of error terms we find that standard errors are inflated and our t-statistics 
are approximately twice those estimated when using clustering. Thus our initial 
models are: 
ESG Scoreit = 0 + 1Strategic Holdingit + 2Family Holdingit + 
 3Leverageit + 4Profitabilityit + 5Market-to-Bookit + 6LogMVit + 7InvMillsit + 
cjCit +ikIit + ylYit + eit 
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where ESG Scoreit is the firms-specific assessment provided by ASSET4 for either 
environmental, social or governance practices, Strategic Holdingit is the percentage of 
equity assessed as being closely held, Family Holdingit is the percentage of equity 
held by family or employee shareholders, Leverage, Profitability, Market-to-Book and 
LogMV are the percentiles of long-term debt over equity, net income over book value 
of equity,  market value of equity over book value of equity and the log of the US$ 
value of market capitalisation respectively. We express the leverage, profitability and 
market-to-book ratios as a percentile of the sample distribution to scale them in a 
similar way to the dependent variables that are all calculated on a zero to one hundred 
distribution. InvMillsit is the inverse Mills ratio included to control for sample 
selection bias and Cit, Iit and Yit are country, industry and year dummies. We also run 
the model with country and industry dummies replaced by the mean of the dependent 
variable for each category and find that the results are not significantly changed. This 
specification has various advantages and where it is not specified otherwise we report 
our results using country and industry means rather than dummy variables. The 
standard errors are clustered for firm effects.  
 
Endogeneity and OLS Models 
The model specified above is threatened by potential endogeneity. We have included 
the conventional control for sample selection bias and assume that this problem has 
been resolved. Whilst the inverse Mills ratio is usually statistically significant in our 
models the impact of its inclusion on the significance of the other variables is modest
i
. 
More problematic is the potential threat from omitted correlated variables. Here we 
can postulate that factors not included in our model, or not correctly specified in our 
model, impact on both ESG and family ownership. A common approach to dealing 
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with this is to include firm fixed effects and, if we ignore the issues relating to strict 
endogeneity, which requires inter-temporal endogeneity between the variables in the 
model, this could provide an informative set of results. However, for our sample the 
inclusion of firm fixed effects cancels all significant relationships between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable. Running a between-effects model 
confirms that the explanatory power of the model is driven, almost entirely, by the 
differences between firms and not the differences within firms. This is not unexpected 
given the relatively sticky nature of the variables in our model. ESG performance and 
equity ownership change only slowly. Nevertheless it is worthwhile retaining the 
panel data approach as there are many firms in our sample for which we only have 
results for some years and using a pooled time-series and cross-section allows us to 
control for year differences. 
Consequently the results from our initial model need to be interpreted with 
caution. There remains the possibility that omitted factors are correlated with both our 
test variable, family-held equity, and the dependent variables, ESG scores. As we 
have a control variable which measures all strategic equity, that factor would have to 
be related to family ownership and not to other strategic equity. Even so it is worth 
considering what other factors might impact. Commentators on earlier versions of this 
paper have suggested that the direction of causality is an issue. Indeed it is quite 
possible that investors might be attracted or repelled by ESG performance and hence 
that ESG performance drives strategic ownership. Our results are consistent with 
strategic equity being associated with low ESG performance. If investors believe the 
investment in ESG includes at least a proportion of value-decreasing investments this 
argument is tenable. It may seem less likely for family investors, who are typically 
making a decision to stay with, rather than invest in, a firm but even here family 
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investors may be happier to stay with a firm that does not invest in value-reducing 
projects. Given that we might expect non-family investors such as corporations, 
investment institutions and pension funds to be better able to seek low ESG firms, this 
would bias the results against a negative coefficient on family equity holdings. 
However, we also investigate the possibility of identifying any negative reverse 
causality. 
In order to investigate the direction of causality Jo and Harjoto (2012) 
estimate their model with lagged measure of their test variables, which in our model 
would be strategic, or family-held, equity, and then replace the dependent variable 
with the test variable and use the lagged measure of the ESG score as an explanatory 
variable. They interpret their results as demonstrating that governance “causes” CSR 
but not that CSR causes performance. However, we will find that ESG and equity 
holdings, and indeed the governance element of ESG and the two CSR components 
(social and environmental), both appear to cause the other with a significant negative 
coefficient on the lagged explanatory variable in each case. This is consistent with 
mean reverting measures of all three variables.  
 
Quantile Regressions 
Our approach assumes that if we find a negative relationship between strategic stock 
and ESG this could be caused by the stockholders influencing ESG performance or by 
ESG performance attracting such stockholders. We believe that the second possibility 
can be quite reliably ruled out if we can show that firms with good ESG performance 
are also adversely affected by family equity holdings. It is not clear how, under those 
circumstances, it can be argued that the family stockholders have been attracted to 
invest or encouraged to retain an investment by poor ESG if the ESG is in fact good. 
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Conditioning the sample on the dependent variable would be unreliable but we use 
quintile regression to test the relationship between the explanatory variables and ESG 
at the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 quantiles. The median quantile mirrors the original OLS 
models assessment of the mean but as quantile regression minimises mean absolute 
errors rather than mean squared errors it serves as a useful check on the influence of 
outliers. It also provides an opportunity to benchmark the significance tests from the 
quantile regressions which are not adjusted for firm-specific clustering in the standard 
errors with the OLS regressions which are. The first and third quartile regressions 
measure the impact of family equity holdings on firms with unexpectedly low and 
high ESG firms respectively. If we find a significant negative coefficient on family 
holdings for firms at the 75
th
 quartile it remains consistent with family holdings 
negatively affecting ESG. Conversely, given the relatively high level of ESG, it 
would be unreasonable to believe that low ESG has attracted family shareholdings. 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
Previous analysis acknowledges that omitted correlated variables may remain a 
source of endogeneity. We use propensity score matching as an approach which will 
help to rule out such explanations as unlikely. PSM matches treated firms, those with 
family equity holdings, against control firms, those without, but where the control and 
treated firms are equally likely to have had a family holding. By construction we will 
expect to find that both groups will be equally matched with regards to the variables 
included in the matching equation. Given that the control firms are a selection from 
the population of untreated firms with explicit matching on a set of variables, there is 
no a priori reason to expect that the treatment and control firms will be unbalanced 
with regards to any omitted correlated variable from the OLS regressions. This does 
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not ensure independence from omitted variables but such contamination is unlikely. It 
also does not prove the direction of causality – only that treated firms have different 
“outcomes” from the control firms. This difference may be because the outcome has 
caused the treatment; our use of quantile regressions is designed to test whether this is 
the case or not. 
The following equation is used to estimate the probability that a firm will be 
identified as receiving treatment i.e. categorised as having high leverage, or strategic 
equity holdings or any of its components.  Here Treatmentit represents a zero-one 
variable where one indicates that the case receives treatment and zero that it does not. 
The control variables for leverage, return on equity, market-to-book and capitalisation 
are calculated as in the initial equation. The year, country and industry variables are a 
vector of dummies identifying each firm’s membership of each category. The 
equation is estimated as a probit model. In this case the results for probit or logit 
estimation are virtually indistinguishable. 
Treatmentit = 0 + 1Leverageit + 2Profitabilityit + 3Market-toBookit + 4LogMVit +  
cjCit +ikIit + ylYit + eit 
The cases that received treatment are then matched with a case, or a sample of 
cases, that did not receive treatment but where the probability of being classified as 
treated is approximately similar, defined as  pr(Treatment),Y  pr(Treatment),N, 
where pr(PRT) is the predicted value from the equation above. The treatment effect is 
then the difference in ESG Scoreit between the two cases. There are a number of ways 
in which cases may be matched and the statistical significance of the treatment effect 
estimated (Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). The results reported in this paper are based 
on matching the treatment case with the five nearest neighbours by pr(Treatment), 
with replacement, as long as these five fall within 0.001 pr(Treatment). We use the 
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normal T-test of difference between two matched samples. This implies that an 
untreated case can be matched with more than one treated case but obviously no case 
will include the same matched pair. The T-test also makes no allowance for the fact 
that the matching probabilities are estimated. The tests were not sensitive to different 
matching approaches. 
 
Sample Statistics 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics from our sample. We use 24,873 
firm years drawn from 2002 to 2012 inclusive. This sample includes 3,919 separate 
firms with 953 cases from 2002 rising to 3,633 in 2010 and tailing off to 1,503 in 
2012. As social, environmental, governance, leverage, profitability and market-to-
book are all calculated to fall between 0 and 100 the means close to 50 are to be 
expected. The mean strategic shareholding is 26.25 percent and the mean family 
shareholding 3.42 percent. If we restrict the sample to the 20,743 cases with some 
strategic holding we find little change in either the ESG dependent variables or the 
explanatory variables with only a modest rise to 31.47 percent for strategic holdings 
and 4.10 percent for family strategic holdings. However, when the sample is restricted 
to the 3,688 cases with family strategic holdings the value of the ESG variables all 
show a clear decline, the control variables are broadly similar, the mean for strategic 
holdings rises slightly to 38.56 percent and the mean family strategic holding rises to 
23.08 percent. Thus, the firms with family strategic shareholdings, which are the 
focus of our study, typically have an estimated 23.08 percent held by the family 
and/or employees with, on average, another 15.48 percent held by other strategic 
investors. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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Table 2 reports the correlation matrix for the variables used in our tests. We 
include product moment correlations beneath the diagonal and Spearman rank 
correlations above, but as most of our variables are constructed so as to rule out 
outliers there is barely any difference between the two sets of correlations.  The 
ASSET4 social and environmental scores are highly correlated (0.76), but the 
governance score is relatively modestly correlated with the social score (0.31) and the 
environmental score (0.17). All three scores are negatively correlated with strategic 
and family holdings and the correlations between the ESG outcome variables and the 
control variables are quite varied apart from the stable relationship between leverage 
and all three measures of ESG performance. The differing responses of the ESG 
scores to the other control variables and to the test variables suggests that the social, 
environmental and governance scores are rather different constructs. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
RESULTS 
 
Panel Data Tests of Association 
Table 3 reports our initial results of the panel data analysis of social, environmental 
and governance performance of our sample of firms. In models 1 to 6 we establish 
that the model is robust to the choice to include dummy variables for industry and 
country difference or to use industry and country averages. We estimate slope 
coefficients on strategic shareholdings which have very similar coefficients and 
statistical significance whether we use dummies (Model 1: =-0.07, p<0.001, Model 
2: =-0.09, p<0.001, Model 3: =-0.14, p<0.001) or averages (Model 4: =-0.06, 
p<0.001, Model 5: =-0.8, p<0.001, Model 6: =-0.13, p<0.001) and in all later tests 
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we use averages. In models 7, 8 and 9 we add the family holding variable to 
investigate whether family holdings have an association with ESG performance 
beyond that explained by strategic holdings. The slope coefficients on strategic 
holdings are slightly reduced but remain negative and statistically significant (Model 
7: =-0.04, p<0.001, Model 8: =-0.06, p<0.001, Model 9: =-0.11, p<0.001) whilst 
the additional impact of family holdings is strongly negative and statistical significant 
in all three models (Model 7: =-0.15, p<0.001, Model 8: =-0.14, p<0.001, Model 9: 
=-0.15, p<0.001). It should be noted that the full relationship between the ESG 
variables and family holdings is the sum of the slope coefficients on both strategic 
holdings, which includes family holdings, and family holding itself. The mean of the 
percentage held by families, if they have a holding at all, as reported in Table 1, is 23 
percent, which implies that firms with family ownership typically have 4.37 points 
less on their social score (0.23*(-4-15)), 4.6 points less on environmental (0.23*((-6-
14)) and 5.98 points less on governance (0.23*(-11-15)). In each case the mean score 
is standardised at 50 so approximately 10 percent of a firm’s typical score can be 
affected by the average family equity holding. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
In the final two models in Table 3 we examine whether governance intervenes 
between the ownership characteristics and the social and environmental performance 
by including governance as an explanatory variable. Thus we hypothesise that 
ownership may impact on governance which impacts on social and environmental 
performance but it is unclear whether ownership will impact on performance beyond 
its influence via governance. Our hypothesis is that family owners are more likely 
than other strategic equity holders to be involved in management of the firm and we 
expect a stronger relationship between ownership and social and environmental 
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performance for family owners, after controlling for governance, than for other 
strategic shareholders. In models 9 and 10 we observe a strong positive relationship 
between governance and social and environmental performance (Model 10: =0.25, 
p<0.001, Model 11: =0.26, p<0.001), no remaining relationship between strategic 
shareholdings and either dependent variable (Model 10: =0.00, insignificant, Model 
11: =-0.01, insignificant), but a strong negative association between family 
ownership and both social and environmental performance (Model 10: =-0.09, 
p<0.01, Model 11: =-0.09, p<0.001). 
The results reported in Table 3 show a robust negative association between 
family strategic shareholdings and a firm’s social, environmental and governance 
performance after controlling for strategic shareholdings in total, industry, country 
and year differences and firm-specific estimates of leverage, profitability, market-to-
book and capitalisation. These offer support for hypothesis one, that strategic equity 
holdings reduce ESG, hypothesis two, that family strategic holdings have a stronger 
negative impact than general strategic holdings, hypothesis three, that allowing for the 
influence of governance reduces the direct impact of strategic holdings on social and 
environmental scores, and hypothesis four, that such mitigating impact is less strong 
for the influence of family strategic holdings. However, such tests cannot demonstrate 
the direction of causality nor rule out the possibility of omitted correlated variables. In 
the following sections we first investigate the impact of causality and then that of 
omitted variables. 
 
Testing Causality Using Quantile Regressions 
We have argued that it is unlikely that family investors would be attracted by low 
ESG performance. Typically family investors gradually reduce their investment but 
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even then it is possible that they could be less likely to sell if the firm has low ESG. 
But for these firms with higher than normal ESG we cannot argue that low ESG is 
attracting or retaining family investors. Whilst this may be an unusual use of quantile 
regressions we are able to estimate the relationship between family ownership and 
ESG at different quantiles and in this instance we test the 25
th
 and 75
th
 quantiles.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
In Table 4 we report the results for a re-estimation of models 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 
of Table 3 for both the 25
th
 quantile (models 1 to 5) and the 75
th
 quantile (models 6 to 
10). In these quantiles we are unable to adjust our significance tests for clustering by 
firm. However, by re-estimating the results from Table 3 for the 50
th
 quantile (see 
appendix 1) and comparing these with the slope coefficient estimates and standard 
errors we are able to estimate the realistic level of overstatement in the reported t-
statistics. The slope coefficients are generally very similar from the OLS and quantile 
regression but the t-statistics can vary from approximate equality to approximately 
twice as large. Thus, to be conservative, we would not treat any slope coefficient not 
associated with a t-statistic of at least twice that normally considered critical to be 
reliably statistically significant. (To avoid confusion we use the statistical results as 
generated by the statistical models in our discussion.) 
In Table 4 we report slope coefficients on strategic shareholdings for the 25
th
 
percentile in models of social, environmental, governance performance and then 
social and environmental performance with governance as an independent variable 
which are negative and significant in the first three cases and insignificantly different 
from zero in the later two (Model 1: =-0.06, p<0.001, Model 2: =-0.04, p<0.001, 
Model 3: =-0.17, p<0.001, Model 4: =-0.02, p<0.1, Model 5: =0.01, 
insignificant). The equivalent results for the 75
th
 quantile are broadly similar save that 
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the coefficient on strategic shareholdings in the regression modelling of governance is 
somewhat lower than for the 25
th
 quantile (Model 6: =-0.04, p<0.001, Model 7: =-
0.06, p<0.001, Model 8: =-0.05, p<0.001, Model 9: =-0.00, insignificant, Model 
10: =-0.02, p<0.05).  
However, our analysis is focused on family shareholdings and for the 25
th
 
percentile we report significant negative coefficients for the models of social, 
environmental and governance performance and insignificant, or barely significant, 
negative coefficients when governance is included as an explanatory variable (Model 
1: =-0.10, p<0.001, Model 2: =-0.10, p<0.001, Model 3: =-0.17, p<0.001, Model 
4: =-0.03, insignificant, Model 5: =-0.03, p<0.1). However, in all cases for the 75th 
quantile we estimate negative slope coefficients that are robustly significant (Model 6: 
=-0.16, p<0.001, Model 7: =-0.15, p<0.001, Model 8: =-0.16, p<0.001, Model 9: 
=-0.09, p<0.001, Model 10: =-0.12, p<0.001). Model 8 has roughly the same 
coefficient for both quantiles; in models 6,7,9 and 10 the results for the 75
th
 quantile 
are more negative. If the reverse causality story were true we would expect the results 
to be stronger for the 25
th
 quantile. 
 
Propensity Score Matching Tests of Association 
Unlike the quantile regressions, propensity score matching cannot comment on the 
direction of causality. However, the test attempts to simulate a randomised 
experiment that explicitly equalises the distribution of those variables used in the 
calculation of the propensity scores. Thus, we find that the firm-specific variables 
used do indeed have similar means across out treatment and control groups (see 
Appendices 2 and 3). Further, advocates of propensity score matching suggest that we 
can expect other variables to be randomly distributed between the two groups. We 
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also find that industry, country and year averages of the dependent variables are 
indistinguishable between our treatment and control groups and these values have not 
been used in the construction of the propensity scores.  Thus we have no reason to 
suppose that there are correlated omitted variables excluded from our model. Our 
results show that we have treatment firms (with family strategic shareholdings of 
more than 10 percent) and control firms (with family strategic shareholdings of less 
than 10 percent) which are indistinguishable on all other observable variables. 
However, we do not view this as demonstrating causality as the test variable may 
have caused the treatment or the treatment the test variable.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
In Table 5 we report six different propensity score matching tests. In the first 
three we match treated cases with a) all other cases, b) cases which have significant 
(greater than 10 percent) strategic holdings apart from family holdings, and c) cases 
which have no such other significant holdings. For these tests propensity scores have 
been calculated using leverage, profitability, market-to-book, the log of capitalisation 
and industry, country and year dummies. For the second set of three tests we repeat 
the experiment but include governance as an extra variable in the propensity score 
matching. We report only the version of the tests that can be used to investigate the 
significance of the difference between the treatment and control groups. We estimate 
the control value using the average of the five control cases that come closest to the 
treatment case in propensity score as long as those five fall within 0.001 of the 
treatment case score. If we cannot identify five matching firms the case is discarded. 
As is usual with propensity score matching we have used a number of alternative 
estimation techniques and find our results insensitive to the approach used.  
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In Table 5 we estimate the difference in the environmental, social and 
governance scores between the treatment and control groups. In model 1, where all 
firms are included, we find the difference is negative and strongly significant for all 
three outcomes (Model 1a =-5.45, p<0.001, Model 1b =-6.13, p<0.001, Model 1c 
=-6.55, p<0.001). These magnitudes are similar to those implied by the OLS 
regression analysis conducted earlier. For the results where we restrict the control 
group to other firms with strategic holdings the results remain significantly negative 
but slightly smaller (Model 2a =-4.61, p<0.001, Model 2b =-5.01, p<0.001, Model 
2c =-4.03, p<0.001) and for firms without other strategic holdings slightly larger 
(Model 3a =-6.98, p<0.001, Model 3b =-7.57, p<0.001, Model 1c =-11.07, 
p<0.001). As we estimated a negative reaction between strategic holdings in general 
and ESG these results are to be expected. 
In the models 4, 5 and 6 we include governance in the propensity score model 
as an approximate equivalent to the earlier regression models where we sought to 
estimate the impact of family strategic shareholdings beyond the influence of 
governance. Naturally, the model should result in approximate parity between the 
governance score for the treatment and control groups and this is indeed what we find. 
Thus, in model 4 using all cases to construct the control group we find statistically 
significant negative treatment effects, although weaker than in model 1 (Model 4a =-
2.59, p<0.01, Model 4b =-3.43, p<0.001, Model 4c =-0.60, insignificant). When 
we restrict the control group to firms with strategic shareholdings we find a similar 
and significant negative effect to that estimated in model 4 (Model 5a =-3.33, 
p<0.001, Model 5b =-4.51, p<0.001, Model 5c =-0.61, insignificant). Finally, we 
use only firms with no other strategic shareholding to form the control group and here 
our results are somewhat weaker with only the test of environmental score statistically 
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significant (Model 6a =-1.16, insignificant, Model 6b =-2.43, p<0.01, Model 6c 
=-0.61, insignificant). 
It is not clear to us why this final result should occur. We have three groups of 
firms: those with family holdings of more than 10%, those with other strategic 
holdings of more than 10 percent and those with staretgic holdings of less than 10 
percent. We had expected that firms without any strategic shareholdings would be 
more different from those with family holdings than those with other strategic 
holdings. This is the result we found when running the third test in Table 5. However, 
after allowing for the impact of governance the change in the results is clear. When 
we contrast the environmental and social performance of firms with strategic family 
shareholdings with those that have no other strategic shareholdings there is only a 
modest difference that is insignificant for social performance and marginally 
significant for environmental performance. However, this is consistent with the 
results derived from the 25
th
 quantile regression analysis in table 4. It would seem that 
in general the impact of family strategic holdings on social and environmental 
performance is largely accounted for by the transmission effect via the impact of 
governance. 
Given the results of our initial panel data regressions, the quantile regressions 
and the propensity score analysis we find our results consistent with all four 
hypotheses. Strategic holdings appear to reduce ESG; family strategic holdings do so 
more powerfully; conditioning for the direct influence of governance reduces the 
impact of strategic holdings - in fact it negates it; and conditioning for the influence of 
governance reduces but typically does not negate the impact of family strategic 
holdings. 
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Country Analysis 
We run country-specific regression for thirteen countries with the largest samples, the 
smallest of which is 334 firm/years. The power of the test is fairly weak as the 
industry categories include 38 dummies. However, the country-specific regressions 
also confirm the overall statistical significance of our full sample tests. The 
distribution of coefficients is of interest. When modelling the social score strategic 
shareholdings are negative for Australia, Hong Kong, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK 
and the USA but not for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore or Spain. 
When modelling the environment score Germany switches to negative, as does Spain. 
When we examine the impact of family strategic holdings all bar France and Germany 
are negative for social score and all bar Germany and Singapore for the environment 
score. The results for governance are rather more clear-cut. The impact of strategic 
holdings is always positive save for Italy, which is effectively zero, and the impact of 
family holdings is always negative, again except for Italy. This does not mean that 
family holdings have a negative influence on governance, but that strategic holdings 
excluding the family portion have a positive impact. 
 
We have also investigated the difference between the results for categories of 
countries such as code versus common law or co-ordinated market economies versus 
liberal market economies. We can identify differences according to these 
dichotomies, most notably in the impact of strategic shareholdings. However, the 
discussion above reveals that this classification is more apparent than real and is 
largely driven by the large samples from Japan and the USA. What we can confirm is 
that for almost all countries, after controlling for the total strategic holdings family 
strategic holdings is negatively associated with all of social, environmental and 
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governance scores. The one country that is perhaps unusual is Germany. For this 
country we estimate a positive and statistically significant relationship between family 
shareholdings and both the environment and social scores. These results offers a route 
for further analysis and the work of Kang and Moon (2012) suggests that the result for 
Germany should not be altogether unexpected. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We re-estimate the basic models using the Datastream measure of closely-held stock 
rather than the strategic holdings estimate. This measure is broadly similar to the 
strategic measure but has been available for longer and has been based on a consistent 
definition throughout our sample period. It is, however, not uniformly defined across 
countries but as we control for country difference this should not be crucial. We also 
re-estimate the models reported in table 3 using quantile regressions which are less 
sensitive to outliers. Whether using closely-held or strategic shareholdings or using 
OLS or quantile regressions the results are robust. 
 We also look at sub-scores of the three ASSET4 ESG measures. Whilst we 
have access to further components, and indeed to the components that ASSET4 use to 
generate their scores, we prefer to use the main scores published by ASSET4, which 
are presumably designed to meet demand from investment institutions, and to avoid 
any possible data-mining bias which might come from hunting through the 
components. Corporate governance has five components: board structure, board 
functions, compensation policy, shareholder rights and vision and strategy. All are 
significantly negatively associated with strategic shareholdings and all bar 
compensation policy are additionally significantly negatively associated with strategic 
family holdings. All bar board function have a significant and positive impact on the 
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social score and all bar board function and compensation policy have a significant 
positive impact on the environmental score. The social score has seven dimensions:  
community, diversity and opportunity, employment quality, health and safety, human 
rights, product responsibility and training and development. Only diversity and 
opportunity, human rights and product responsibility have a significant negative 
association with total strategic holdings whereas all but human rights and product 
responsibility have an additional significant negative relationship with strategic 
family holdings. The environmental score has three components: emission reduction, 
product innovation and resource reduction. All three are significantly negatively 
associated with both strategic and with family holdings. Taken together these 
sensitivity results suggest that the main results reported in Table 3 are supported by 
more detailed analysis. There are differences in the strength of the relationship across 
components, and although Rees and Rodionova (2012) have made a preliminary 
analysis, it would be interesting to investigate this further. However, the overall story 
remains the same: strategic shareholdings are associated with lower ESG scores in 
general and in general family strategic holdings have an additional negative 
association. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
It can be argued that undiversified shareholders, such as family equity holders, will 
oppose ESG investment as at least a proportion of that investment may be value-
destroying. Thus, significant family shareholders may have both the influence and 
incentive to resist ESG investment. Conversely, it could be argued that family 
shareholders may be more committed to the interests of other stakeholders with whom 
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they may have had a long-term association. In that case they could be more willing to 
support value-destroying ESG given the benefits to other stakeholders. Using a large 
and recent international sample we show that strategic shareholdings are associated 
with lower ESG performance and that this is particularly true for family 
shareholdings. This is consistent with family shareholders discouraging ESG 
investment but it is also consistent with low ESG performance encouraging family 
investors to retain their shareholding. In a panel data regression model, where the 
variables of interest are stable within firms across time, it is very difficult to 
demonstrate that the models are not contaminated by endogeneity. In particular it is 
difficult to demonstrate the direction of causality. 
Our propensity score matching tests are less likely to be affected by omitted 
variables as they represent an attempt to mimic random allocation. Whilst not 
definitively free of contamination they offer support for the prediction that there is a 
negative relationship between family equity holdings and ESG. Furthermore by using 
quantile regressions to test the influence of family equity on ESG for firms which 
have good ESG performance, and again finding a negative relationship, we show that 
the negative relationship holds where it is difficult to argue that low ESG has 
encouraged family stockholders to retain their holding. Overall our results remain 
consistent with strategic equity holders, and family shareholders in particular, 
discouraging ESG performance.  
Our study has also investigated the relationship between environmental and 
social CSR and strategic stockholdings via corporate governance. In the main we find 
that strategic equity holdings have little impact on social and environmental 
performance once governance has been accounted for. Thus strategic holdings may 
impact on social and environmental performance but only via their impact on 
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governance. Conversely, we find that family strategic shareholdings may impact on 
social and environmental scores even after allowing for the intervening effect of 
governance. This result is less robust than the direct impact estimated without an 
intervening governance variable but is consistent with family equity holders 
influencing the social and environmental performance directly.  
Throughout we have assumed that the ASSET4 measures of social, 
environmental and governance performance are indicative of underlying performance. 
Previous work has shown ASSET4 scores to be highly correlated with other measures 
on ESG performance such as FTSE4Good or Risk Metrics (previously KLD). If these 
scores do reflect underlying performance we would argue that these are important 
constructs. The environmental threat is clear, the social performance of firms is an 
issue of increasing importance and the failures of corporate governance are cited as 
being partly behind the recent and continuing economic crisis. Under these 
circumstances regulators, governments and stakeholders will be concerned to improve 
firms’ ESG performance. Our results suggest that particular attention may need to be 
paid to firms with substantial strategic shareholdings. The implications of our results 
are that, should we wish to improve ESG, diversified shareholding should be 
encouraged or regulations and institutions established to improve the performance of 
firms with substantial strategic holdings. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 social environment governance strategic family leverage profitability MTB Log(MV) 
All          
Mean 50.99 50.71 52.94 26.25 3.42 51.94 51.03 50.38 15.38 
Std. Dev 30.85 31.97 30.06 23.27 10.93 28.63 28.41 28.79 1.34 
p25 21.11 17.44 23.87 7.00 0.00 29.00 27.00 25.00 14.54 
p50 50.48 48.03 60.87 20.00 0.00 53.00 51.00 50.00 15.31 
p75 81.62 84.75 79.31 43.00 0.00 76.00 76.00 75.00 16.21 
N 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 
If strategic > 0          
Mean 50.35 49.52 53.29 31.47 4.10 51.58 51.38 51.12 15.33 
Std. Dev 30.66 31.73 29.49 22.02 11.85 28.78 28.56 28.89 1.31 
p25 20.84 17.28 25.92 13.00 0.00 28.00 27.00 26.00 14.51 
p50 48.90 45.17 60.87 26.00 0.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 15.28 
p75 80.72 83.10 78.85 49.00 0.00 76.00 76.00 76.00 16.14 
N 20743 20743 20743 20743 20743 20743 20743 20743 20743 
If family >0          
Mean 45.67 44.15 45.11 38.56 23.08 48.13 53.77 53.54 15.05 
Std. Dev 29.87 30.48 29.14 19.91 18.77 30.05 28.80 29.92 1.35 
p25 17.99 16.36 16.30 22.00 8.00 22.00 30.00 26.00 14.17 
p50 41.17 34.35 46.67 36.00 17.00 48.00 57.00 56.00 14.99 
p75 73.13 74.85 71.47 54.00 33.00 74.00 79.00 80.00 15.94 
N 3688 3688 3688 3688 3688 3688 3688 3688 3688 
Descriptive statistics are presented for the full sample, for a sub-sample for which strategic equity holdings are assessed as greater than zero and 
a second sub-sample for which family equity holdings are assessed as greater than zero. The social, environment and governance variables are 
the ASSET4 assessment of the firms performance on each of those dimensions, strategic and family are the Datastream measure of strategic 
holdings in total and those strategic holdings attributable to family or employees, leverage, profitability and market-to-book are the cross sample 
percentiles of each variable where the original ratios are calculated as long-term debt over long-term debt plus equity, net income over equity 
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and market value of equity over the book value of equity. The log of market capitalization is calculated using US$ values.  
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 social environment government strategic family leverage profitability MTB Log(MV) 
social 1.00 0.75*** 0.35*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.03*** 0.41*** 
environment 0.76*** 1.00 0.20*** -0.12*** -0.09*** 0.10*** 0.03*** -0.06*** 0.34*** 
governance 0.31*** 0.17*** 1.00 -0.13*** -0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 
strategic -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.15*** 1.00 0.27*** -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.07*** -0.04*** 
family -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.13*** 0.30*** 1.00 -0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** -0.10*** 
leverage 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 1.00 -0.06*** -0.09*** 0.08*** 
profitability 0.12*** 0.03*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.07*** 1.00 0.55*** 0.25*** 
MTB 0.02*** -0.08*** 0.14*** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.10*** 0.55*** 1.00 0.21*** 
Log(MV) 0.41*** 0.35*** 0.16*** -0.02*** -0.06*** 0.08*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 1.00 
The correlation matrix presents the product moment and Spearman correlation statistics between the variables as used in our regression and 
propensity score matching models.  
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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TABLE 3 
Tests of Association Between Strategic and Family Equity Holdings and Social, Environmental and Governance Performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
DV =  soc env gov soc env gov soc env gov soc env 
            
Governance          0.25*** 0.26*** 
          (21.33) (22.03) 
            
Strategic -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.04** -0.06*** -0.11*** 0.00 -0.01 
 (5.09) (6.57) (12.11) (4.40) (5.61) (12.79) (2.65) (3.89) (9.98) (0.27) (0.64) 
            
Family       -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.09** -0.09*** 
       (5.32) (4.75) (6.93) (3.25) (3.37) 
            
Leverage 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.02* 0.03** 
 (7.13) (7.94) (6.38) (4.60) (5.54) (5.73) (4.49) (5.47) (5.64) (2.06) (2.95) 
            
Profitability 0.01 0.02 -0.02* 0.03*** 0.03** -0.00 0.04*** 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.02* 
 (1.30) (1.53) (2.07) (3.34) (3.09) (0.06) (3.48) (3.25) (0.19) (2.71) (2.44) 
            
MTB -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.01 -0.05*** -0.09*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.12*** 
 (6.61) (10.10) (1.39) (4.06) (7.30) (1.22) (3.88) (7.13) (0.96) (7.42) (9.61) 
            
Log(MV) 11.09*** 11.29*** 5.26*** 7.81*** 7.46*** 3.82*** 7.71*** 7.37*** 3.68*** 7.14*** 7.17*** 
 (35.81) (37.13) (22.93) (27.76) (26.70) (18.63) (27.44) (26.30) (17.92) (26.43) (26.91) 
            
Industry Y Y Y 0.61*** 0.76*** 0.20*** 0.60*** 0.75*** 0.20*** 0.60*** 0.75*** 
    (15.80) (26.38) (6.29) (15.62) (26.17) (6.34) (16.37) (27.50) 
            
Country Y Y Y 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.99*** 0.89*** 0.83*** 0.99*** 0.90*** 1.06*** 
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    (30.19) (26.68) (101.83) (30.66) (27.07) (101.88) (33.24) (35.95) 
            
Mills 0.66 3.25*** 7.79*** -7.71*** -6.65*** 0.22 -8.09*** -6.94*** -0.30 -7.13*** -1.95 
 (0.70) (3.76) (9.47) (6.76) (6.13) (0.25) (7.10) (6.39) (0.34) (6.52) (1.89) 
            
N 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 
R-sq 0.414 0.456 0.650 0.367 0.404 0.632 0.369 0.406 0.635 0.422 0.452 
            
This table presents the results of OLS regressions of ESG performance for the period 2002 to 2012 where the dependent variable is social (soc), 
environmental (env) and governance (gov) performance as assessed by ASSET4 and the test variables are strategic equity holdings, family 
equity holdings (models 7 to 10 only) and  governance (models 9 and 10 only). Control variables are leverage, profitability, market-to-book and 
the log of capitalisation, industry and country dummies (models 1 to 3) industry and country averages of the dependent variable (models 4 to 
10), the inverse Mills ratio and year dummies (unreported). T-statistics are calculated using company clustered standard errors. 
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001           
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TABLE 4 
Quantile Regressions Models of Strategic and Family Equity Holdings on Social, Environmental and Governance Performance 
 25
th
 Percentile  75
th
 Percentile  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
DV =  soc env gov soc env soc env gov soc env 
           
governance    0.29*** 0.28***    0.24*** 0.26*** 
    (40.34) (42.71)    (32.05) (34.29) 
           
strategic -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.02
+
 0.01 -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.02* 
 (6.45) (4.28) (25.38) (1.90) (0.78) (4.08) (6.14) (8.93) (0.07) (2.07) 
           
family -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.03 -0.03
+
 -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.12*** 
 (4.83) (5.30) (12.10) (1.26) (1.87) (7.61) (7.26) (13.31) (4.43) (5.75) 
           
Leverage 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.01* 0.01
+
 0.02* 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (6.46) (5.59) (1.98) (1.86) (2.24) (6.74) (10.54) (10.82) (4.27) (4.06) 
           
profitability 0.05*** 0.03*** -0.00 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.01** 0.02* 0.00 
 (5.54) (4.12) (0.66) (5.34) (4.43) (3.78) (2.27) (2.64) (2.29) (0.38) 
           
MTB -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.01 -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 
 (7.50) (9.68) (0.85) (12.09) (15.09) (9.42) (13.09) (8.45) (13.00) (17.19) 
           
Log(MV) 8.69*** 7.11*** 3.71*** 7.73*** 6.70*** 8.10*** 7.99*** 3.24*** 7.56*** 7.32*** 
 (55.89) (51.09) (32.32) (50.65) (50.22) (48.25) (46.88) (32.36) (46.02) (44.05) 
           
soc_ind 0.53*** 0.69*** 0.28*** 0.49*** 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.13*** 0.75*** 0.82*** 
 (21.64) (42.42) (14.27) (21.19) (45.37) (31.46) (44.18) (7.24) (33.39) (49.19) 
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soc_state 1.10*** 0.93*** 0.98*** 1.07*** 1.16*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 1.08*** 0.80*** 0.99*** 
 (58.72) (54.23) (145.39) (59.57) (71.32) (41.93) (42.92) (200.91) (44.01) (57.13) 
           
soc_yr 1.39*** 1.36*** 1.04*** 1.00*** 1.12*** 0.79*** 0.70*** 1.28*** 0.73*** 0.54*** 
 (19.94) (24.76) (14.94) (15.09) (21.42) (12.37) (12.92) (23.46) (11.50) (10.33) 
           
N 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 
Psudo R-sq 0.19 0.16 0.46 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.35 0.22 0.24 
           
This table presents the results of quantile regressions of ESG performance for the period 2002 to 2012 where the dependent variable is social 
(soc), environmental (env) and governance (gov) performance as assessed by ASSET4 and the test variables are strategic equity holdings, family 
equity holdings and governance (models 4, 5 8 and 9 only). Control variables are leverage, profitability, market-to-book and the log of 
capitalisation, industry, country and year averages of the dependent variables. T-statistics do not compensate for any clustering in the standard 
errors and significance tests should be used with caution. 
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001          
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TABLE 5 
Propensity Score Matching Tests of the Impact of Family Equity Holdings on Social, Environmental and Governance Performance 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Model 1: Family vs. All (Propensity score excludes governance) 
social Unmatched 44.18 51.73 -7.56*** 0.63 -12.01 
 ATT 44.20 49.65 -5.45*** 0.71 -7.70 
environment Unmatched 41.97 51.75 -9.78*** 0.65 -15.04 
 ATT 42.01 48.14 -6.13*** 0.72 -8.56 
governance Unmatched 43.80 54.27 -10.47*** 0.61 -17.13 
 ATT 43.99 50.54 -6.55*** 0.69 -9.55 
Model 2: Family vs. Strategic (Propensity score excludes governance) 
social Unmatched 43.40 49.98 -6.59*** 0.89 -7.39 
 ATT 43.36 47.97 -4.61*** 1.00 -4.60 
environment Unmatched 41.49 48.73 -7.24*** 0.91 -7.93 
 ATT 41.39 46.40 -5.01*** 1.00 -5.02 
governance Unmatched 45.77 54.21 -8.44*** 0.84 -10.03 
 ATT 45.94 49.97 -4.03*** 0.98 -4.10 
Model 3: Family vs. Other (Propensity score excludes governance) 
social Unmatched 44.86 54.49 -9.64*** 0.92 -10.43 
 ATT 44.46 51.45 -6.98*** 1.17 -5.98 
environment Unmatched 42.40 56.78 -14.38*** 0.96 -15.02 
 ATT 42.54 50.11 -7.57*** 1.20 -6.31 
governance Unmatched 41.91 54.36 -12.45*** 0.94 -13.28 
 ATT 43.52 54.60 -11.07*** 1.12 -9.91 
Model 4: Family vs. All (Propensity score includes governance) 
social Unmatched 44.18 51.73 -7.56*** 0.63 -12.01 
 ATT 44.27 46.86 -2.59** 0.72 -3.59 
environment Unmatched 41.97 51.75 -9.78*** 0.65 -15.04 
 ATT 42.09 45.52 -3.43*** 0.73 -4.71 
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governance Unmatched 43.80 54.27 -10.47*** 0.61 -17.13 
 ATT 44.04 44.64 -0.60 0.70 -0.87 
Model 5: Family vs. Strategic (Propensity score includes governance) 
social Unmatched 43.40 49.98 -6.59*** 0.89 -7.39 
 ATT 43.18 46.51 -3.33*** 1.00 -3.34 
environment Unmatched 41.49 48.73 -7.24*** 0.91 -7.93 
 ATT 41.17 45.68 -4.51*** 1.00 -4.53 
governance Unmatched 45.77 54.21 -8.44*** 0.84 -10.03 
 ATT 46.31 46.91 -0.61 0.97 -0.62 
Model 6: Family vs. Other (Propensity score includes governance) 
social Unmatched 44.86 54.49 -9.64*** 0.92 -10.43 
 ATT 45.27 46.43 -1.16 1.20 -0.97 
environment Unmatched 42.40 56.78 -14.38*** 0.96 -15.02 
 ATT 43.25 45.58 -2.34** 1.23 -1.90 
governance Unmatched 41.91 54.36 -12.45*** 0.94 -13.28 
 ATT 44.57 45.18 -0.61 1.14 -0.54 
This table presents the results of propensity score matched analysis of the impact of family holdings of greater than 10 percent when matched 
with a) all firms in the sample, b) those firms in the sample who have strategic equity holdings of more than 10 percent excluding family 
holdings and c) those firms that have strategic equity holdings excluding family equity holdings of less than 10 percent. In the first three tests the 
propensity of the firms to have family holdings of more than 10 percent is estimated using percentiles of leverage, profitability, market-to-book 
and the log of market capitalisation plus industry, country and year dummies. In the final three tests the propensity score estimation is 
supplemented by the inclusion of the governance variable. Each treatment case (family equity > 10 percent) is matched with the five control 
cases with propensity scores falling within plus or minus 0.001 probability of treatment. The estimated average impact of treatment on the 
treated (ATT) is reported in the difference column and the estimated t-statistic is reported in the final column.  
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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APPENDIX 1 
Quantile Regressions Models of Strategic and Family Equity Holdings on Social, Environmental and Governance Performance  
(50
th
 Percentile) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 Model 4 Model 5 
DV =  soc env gov soc env 
      
governance    0.31*** 0.24*** 
    (46.30) (27.71) 
      
strategic -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.10*** 0.00 -0.05*** 
 (7.19) (9.58) (17.61) (0.27) (4.01) 
      
family -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 
 (4.81) (6.92) (12.75) (4.34) (3.31) 
      
leverage 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.03*** 
 (5.77) (7.10) (6.35) (2.68) (3.96) 
      
profitability 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.03** 
 (3.77) (4.05) (1.50) (5.38) (3.00) 
      
MTB -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.02*** -0.11*** -0.15*** 
 (8.00) (15.35) (4.42) (13.68) (13.95) 
      
Log(MV) 8.78*** 8.05*** 3.45*** 8.00*** 7.55*** 
 (44.30) (54.38) (35.33) (51.37) (37.16) 
      
Industry 0.75*** 0.97*** 0.19*** 0.64*** 0.97*** 
 (27.34) (63.88) (11.37) (30.08) (47.41) 
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Country 1.05*** 1.00*** 1.09*** 1.01*** 1.09*** 
 (46.85) (62.47) (187.43) (57.55) (53.24) 
      
Year 1.17*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 0.87*** 0.94*** 
 (15.13) (20.75) (18.24) (14.37) (20.94) 
      
N 24873 24873 24873 24873 24873 
Psudo R-sq      
      
This table presents the results of quantile regressions of ESG performance for the period 2002 to 2012 where the dependent variable is social 
(soc), environmental (env) and governance (gov) performance as assessed by ASSET4 and the test variables are strategic equity holdings, family 
equity holdings and governance (models 4 and 5 only). Control variables are leverage, profitability, market-to-book and the log of capitalisation, 
industry, country and year averages of the dependent variables. T-statistics are do not compensate for any clustering in the standard errors and 
significance tests should be used with caution. 
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001     
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APPENDIX 2 
Effectiveness of the Matching Process on Control Variables and Industry, Country and Year Averages 
(Governance excluded from Propensity Score) 
  Mean %reduction t-test 
Variable  Treated Control % bias |bias| T p>|t| 
        
leverage Unmatched 49.43 52.47 -10.4  -5.21*** 0.00 
 Matched 49.50 48.98 1.8 82.8 0.65 0.51 
        
profitability Unmatched 53.81 50.56 11.3  5.6*** 0.00 
 Matched 53.69 53.70 0 99.6 -0.02 0.98 
        
MTB Unmatched 54.11 49.88 14.4  7.2*** 0.00 
 Matched 53.96 53.88 0.3 97.9 0.11 0.91 
        
Log(MV) Unmatched 15.05 15.42 -27.5  -13.52*** 0.00 
 Matched 15.05 15.04 0.7 97.3 0.27 0.78 
        
env_ind Unmatched 47.25 50.99 -29.7  -14.38*** 0.00 
 Matched 47.31 46.98 2.6 91.3 0.95 0.34 
        
env_country Unmatched 52.35 50.33 16.3  8.16*** 0.00 
 Matched 52.31 52.07 1.9 88.2 0.68 0.49 
        
env_yr Unmatched 50.42 50.53 -3.1  -1.49 0.13 
 Matched 50.43 50.47 -1 68.2 -0.37 0.71 
        
soc_ind Unmatched 48.20 51.15 -31.2  -15.29*** 0.00 
 Matched 48.22 47.96 2.7 91.3 0.99 0.32 
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soc_state Unmatched 53.47 50.45 25.2  13.02*** 0.00 
 Matched 53.41 53.30 0.9 96.6 0.29 0.76 
        
soc_yr Unmatched 50.71 50.81 -3  -1.42 0.15 
 Matched 50.72 50.75 -0.9 68.7 -0.34 0.73 
        
gov_ind Unmatched 51.92 52.94 -13.4  -6.43*** 0.00 
 Matched 51.90 51.77 1.7 87.2 0.65 0.51 
        
gov_state Unmatched 50.78 53.27 -11.6  -5.39*** 0.00 
 Matched 50.91 51.48 -2.6 77.2 -1.05 0.29 
        
gov_yr Unmatched 52.79 52.83 -2  -0.98 0.32 
 Matched 52.79 52.81 -1 48.4 -0.39 0.69 
        
This table presents the differences between the control variables used in estimating the propensity scores (leverage, profitability, market-to-book 
and the log of market capitalisation) together with industry, country and year averages for each dependent variable. For each case we present the 
mean for the treatment and control group before and after matching, the bias before and after, the reduction in the absolute bias, the t-statistic for 
the difference in means and the p-value for the difference in means. 
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
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APPENDIX 3 
Effectiveness of the Matching Process on Control Variables and Industry, Country and Year Averages 
(Governance Included in Propensity Score) 
  Mean %reduct t-test 
Variable  Treated Control % bias |bias| t p>|t| 
        
governance Unmatched 43.80 54.27 -35.30  -17.13*** 0.00 
 Matched 44.04 44.64 -2.00 94.20 -0.76 0.45 
        
leverage Unmatched 49.43 52.48 -10.40  -5.21*** 0.00 
 Matched 49.46 50.07 -2.10 80.10 -0.75 0.45 
        
profitability Unmatched 53.81 50.56 11.30  5.60*** 0.00 
 Matched 53.76 53.67 0.30 97.30 0.11 0.91 
        
MTB Unmatched 54.12 49.88 14.40  7.20*** 0.00 
 Matched 54.06 53.64 1.40 90.20 0.51 0.61 
        
Log(MV) Unmatched 15.06 15.43 -27.50  -13.52*** 0.00 
 Matched 15.06 15.06 0.50 98.30 0.17 0.87 
        
env_ind Unmatched 47.25 50.99 -29.70  -14.38*** 0.00 
 Matched 47.30 46.87 3.50 88.40 1.28 0.20 
        
env_state Unmatched 52.36 50.34 16.30  8.16*** 0.00 
 Matched 52.34 52.20 1.20 92.90 0.41 0.68 
        
env_yr Unmatched 50.42 50.54 -3.10  -1.49 0.14 
 Matched 50.42 50.38 1.30 59.50 0.48 0.63 
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soc_ind Unmatched 48.21 51.15 -31.20  -15.29*** 0.00 
 Matched 48.22 47.87 3.70 88.00 1.36 0.17 
        
soc_state Unmatched 53.47 50.45 25.20  13.02*** 0.00 
 Matched 53.44 53.56 -1.00 96.20 -0.33 0.74 
        
soc_yr Unmatched 50.72 50.81 -3.00  -1.42 0.16 
 Matched 50.72 50.67 1.40 51.90 0.54 0.59 
        
gov_ind Unmatched 51.93 52.94 -13.40  -6.43*** 0.00 
 Matched 51.92 51.78 1.80 86.50 0.69 0.49 
        
gov_state Unmatched 50.79 53.28 -11.60  -5.39*** 0.00 
 Matched 50.92 51.79 -4.00 65.10 -1.61 0.11 
        
gov_yr Unmatched 52.79 52.84 -2.00  -0.98 0.33 
 Matched 52.79 52.77 1.10 44.40 0.43 0.67 
        
This table presents the differences between the control variables used in estimating the propensity scores (governance, leverage, profitability, 
market-to-book and the log of market capitalisation) together with industry, country and year averages for each dependent variable. For each 
case we present the mean for the treatment and control group before and after matching, the bias before and after, the reduction in the absolute 
bias, the t-statistic for the difference in means and the p-value for the difference in means. 
p<.10 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
***p<.001 
 
 56 
 
                                                        
 
i We collect data on all firms which are potentially subject to ASSET4 ESG evaluation during the sample period 2002-2012. Of these we 
identify explanatory variables for 37,895 firm/years for which we use 24,873 cases with ASSET4 scores. This implies that we may have 
a systematic relationship between the inclusion in our models, the ESG dependent variables and the explanatory variables. The inclusion 
of the inverse Mills ratio controls for the probability of a case being included in the regression model. 
